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THE ACADEMY, CAMPAIGN FINANCE, AND FREE
SPEECH UNDER FIRE
Bradley A. Smith*
INTRODUCTION
One is hard pressed to find anyone who will argue that political
speech is not at the core of the First Amendment.1 Virtually all
scholars and judges today recognize that campaign finance
regulations infringe on core First Amendment rights.2
Despite this, over the past half-century, the great majority of
academic scholarship in the field has been devoted to explaining
why these particular infringements on the First Amendment are
constitutional.3 Academic defenders of the pro-speech view on the
*

Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault Professor of Law, Capital University
Law School. Thanks to Professor Joel Gora and the Journal of Law and Policy for
inviting me to participate in this symposium, and to symposium participants for
sharing thoughts and ideas. This is an expanded version of the remarks delivered
at the symposium.
1
See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (“[I]t can
hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”).
2
See, e.g., Kyle Anne Gray, Is Campaign Finance Reform Even a Thing
Anymore?, MONT. LAW., May 2016, at 11, 26 (noting that even “[t]he dissenters
in Citizens United did not disagree with the basic premise of Buckley and
the Citizens United majority that money facilitates speech, and its expenditure is
protected from government regulation absent a compelling government interest”);
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 334 (2010); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976). Only one of the twenty-one justices to sit on the
Supreme Court in the last forty years has not agreed that the issue should be
analyzed under First Amendment doctrine, and that regulation infringes on First
Amendment rights. See Bradley A. Smith, McCutcheon v. Federal Election
Commission: An Unlikely Blockbuster, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 48, 49 n.5, 50 (2015).
3
See Martin Shapiro, Corruption, Freedom and Equality in Campaign
Financing, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 393 (1989). Shapiro wrote of the “past
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question of money and politics have become few and far between,
and too many profess love for the First Amendment before urging
its despoliation,4 like the husband who ardently professes his fealty
before heading off to meet his mistress.
The topic of this symposium is “Free Speech Under Fire,” and I
have been asked to offer a few words on the question of money and
politics, and to place that debate within the broader context of public
attitudes towards free speech. I suggest that proposals to regulate
campaign finance threaten not only the political speech at the core
of the First Amendment, but undermine support for free speech
more broadly. Moreover, the academy, by attempting to justify this
regulation of core speech on what is often the most wistful of
reasoning, has contributed to a broad decline in support for free
speech. The brevity of these remarks necessitates a very abbreviated
analysis, but one that I hope may stir some serious reflection in the
academy.
To understand the degree of the threat that campaign finance
regulation poses to the First Amendment, we need only look at both
academic proposals that have been made, and actual laws that have
been enacted. Let us start with the latter.
I. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION IN PRACTICE
Modern campaign finance law began in 1974, when Congress
passed amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act
(“FECA”) that capped candidate spending at amounts far too low to
educate the public about issues, and for candidates without
substantial preexisting name recognition to sufficiently reach the

twenty years.” Id. at 393. I have seen nothing to think anything has changed in the
twenty-five-plus years since. A survey of the Westlaw database for law review
articles on campaign finance published in 2015 found that 75 percent (fifty-five
of seventy-three) generally supported more regulation, versus 25 percent neutral
or opposed to more regulation.
4
See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free Speech: Love and
a Question, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 789, 789–90, 793 (1998) (noting his long work
at the ACLU and referring to himself as a “First Amendment warhorse,” but going
on to argue for greater regulation of free speech).
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public to have a reasonable chance of defeating incumbents or
celebrity candidates.5
The 1974 FECA amendments limited candidates in U.S. House
races, for example, to spending just $70,000.6 But in 1974, the
average successful challenger to a House incumbent had spent over
$100,000, 43 percent more than the $70,000 limit imposed by FECA
for future races. The average winning incumbent, however, spent
just $51,309, or 27 percent less than the limit imposed by FECA.7
To update these numbers, $70,000 in 1974 is approximately
$300,000 in 2016. Yet in 2012, challengers who defeated an
incumbent spent, on average, over $2.4 million.8
Additionally, FECA limited citizens’ spending to just $1,000 on
all communications “relative to” a candidate, an amount the
Supreme Court recognized was too low to effectively communicate
with the public.9 This limit applied to political-action committees
5

See JOHN SAMPLES, THE FALLACY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 177
(2006) (“[C]ampaign spending has striking benefits for both electoral competition
and, more generally, for democratic values.”). For benefits of spending on voter
education and political competition, see John J. Coleman, The Distribution of
Campaign Spending Benefits Across Groups, 63 J. POL. 916, 928 (2001); John J.
Coleman & Paul F. Manna, Congressional Spending and the Quality of
Democracy, 62 J. POL. 757, 771 (2000).
6
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55.
7
These averages are calculated from NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL.,
CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, tbl.3-3,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2013/07/vitalstatistics-congress-mann-ornstein/Vital-Statistics-Chapter-3--Campaign-Financein-Congressional-Elections.pdf?la=en (last updated Mar. 14, 2013). Studies by
Gary Jacobson found that higher spending benefitted challengers in the 1972 and
1974 elections, but that the level of incumbent spending had little effect. Gary C.
Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections, 72 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 469, 469 (1978). This strongly suggests that incumbents would
have benefitted from caps on spending in the elections leading up to the passage
of the 1974 FECA amendments.
8
ORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at tbl.3-3. On average, these victorious
challengers were still outspent by incumbents, suggesting the continued vitality
of Jacobson’s conclusion that absolute challenger spending, rather than the ratio
of challenger to incumbent spending, is the more important factor in competitive
elections. See Jacobson, supra note 7, at 469.
9
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22 (“[T]he Act’s $1,000 limitation on independent
expenditures ‘relative to a clearly identified candidate’ precludes most
associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents, the original
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(“PACs”), to individuals, and to advocacy groups and
associations.10 Unions and corporations, including incorporated
nonprofit entities—which constitute the vast majority of citizen
activists and educational organizations, from the Sierra Club to the
NAACP, the NRA, and Right to Life, as well as most small, local
groups—were prohibited entirely from spending money to voice
opinions “in connection with” an election.11 Another provision
limited how much groups could spend or contribute “for the purpose
of influencing” elections without first registering with, and reporting
the names of their members to, the government.12
These provisions, among others, were challenged in Buckley v.
Valeo.13 The Buckley plaintiffs represented a thorough cross-section
of American politics, including former Democratic Senator Eugene
McCarthy, Republican Senator James Buckley, the New York Civil
Liberties Union, the American Conservative Union, the Mississippi
Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, and others. The
ideologically diverse group of plaintiffs arguably demonstrated that
the law was even-handed, not content-based; but it also
demonstrated the broad swath it cut through political participation
in American society. In a lengthy per curiam opinion, the Court
struck down the spending provisions described above on First
Amendment grounds.14 Had these provisions not been struck down
in Buckley, virtually all political information, including information
on candidate voting records, legislative proposals, and more, today
would have to be filtered through officeholders, politicians, and the
institutional press, with voters and the groups they belong to acting
as mere bystanders. Even politicians would have so little to spend as
to be almost entirely at the mercy of the press.

basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection of the freedom of
association.”).
10
See id. at 39–40.
11
52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2014) (“It is unlawful for any national bank, or any
corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution
or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office.”).
12
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 61–63.
13
Id. at 39–58.
14
Id.
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Yet, far from being praised, Buckley has been under steady
assault almost from the day it was published,15 and this criticism
continues today. Indeed, the 2016 Democratic Party national
platform called for overruling Buckley as well as the more recent
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.16 In
2014, fifty-four U.S. Senators—every then-sitting Democrat—
voted for a Constitutional Amendment to specifically allow for
regulation of political spending.17 Had it passed, the Amendment
would have undercut any basis for the Court to strike the spending
provisions of the 1974 FECA Amendments. In 2003, a majorityRepublican Congress enacted, and a Republican president signed
into law, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, an amendment to
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, often known simply as
the “McCain-Feingold” Act after its lead Senate sponsors.18 Going
further than the 1974 FECA Amendments, it prohibited
incorporated citizen advocacy groups from even mentioning the
name of a candidate in a broadcast advertisement made within thirty
days of a primary or caucus or sixty days of a general election.19

15

See Joel M. Gora, The Legacy of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION L.J. 55,
58 (2003) (“[T]he Court’s landmark Buckley ruling was condemned in the
harshest terms by many academics and commentators; it was almost demonized
as a derelict, a sport, a blemish on the law.”). Buckley was decided on January 30,
1976. See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1. By July of 1976, in those pre-computerized days,
the Yale Law Journal was out in print with an article excoriating the decision. See
J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J.
1001, 1005, 1010, 1020–21 (1976) (calling the Buckley opinion “dogma,” a
“blunderbuss,” “blind[],” and “cynical”).
16
The
2016
Democratic
Platform,
DEMOCRATS,
https://www.democrats.org/party-platform (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
17
See Ramsey Cox, Senate GOP Blocks Constitutional Amendment on
Campaign Spending, HILL (Sept. 11, 2014, 2:19 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/flooraction/senate/217449-senate-republicans-block-constitutional-amendment-oncampaign.
18
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–55, 116 Stat.
81 (2002).
19
Id. § 203. In fact, because many media markets overlap state borders, and
states have primaries on different dates, in presidential races the law banned any
broadcast reference to a presidential candidate, including an incumbent, for 200
days or more in many media markets. Bradley A. Smith & Jason Robert Owen,
Boundary-Based Restrictions in Boundless Broadcast Media Markets:
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After initially upholding the constitutionality of this provision of the
McCain-Feingold bill in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission,20 the Supreme Court fortunately reversed course and
substantially narrowed the provision’s reach in Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life,21 before ultimately holding
it unconstitutional in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission.22
II. CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE ACADEMY
Academic proposals, however, have gone even further than
these legal enactments and proposals. Seventeen years ago, my
colleague at this symposium, Richard Hasen, proposed in the pages
of the Texas Law Review that, in order to guarantee greater political
equality, newspapers should be prohibited from using their capital
and income to publish editorial endorsements of candidates.23 He
was not alone, as other professors, including Owen Fiss and Edward
Foley, have also specifically called for limiting press freedoms as
part of campaign finance reform.24 In his recent book, Plutocrats
United, Professor Hasen has backed off that part of his proposal, but
not, so far as I can tell, for any reason of First Amendment principle.
Rather, he has merely decided that the empirical assumptions on
which he relied at the time—that such endorsements were influential

McConnell v. FEC’s Underinclusive Overbreadth Analysis, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 240, 241 (2007).
20
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 105 (2003).
21
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. 449,
457 (2007). In WRTL, the Court limited the reach of this provision to add:
“susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate.” Id. at 470.
22
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010).
23
Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch
Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1630 (1999) [hereinafter Hasen, Campaign
Finance Laws]. Professor Hasen would have allowed newspapers to form, and
ask their owners, managers, and executives to contribute to a PAC, which would
then be allowed to buy ad space in owners own newspaper. Id. at 1635.
24
Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405,
1411–13 (1986); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-per-Voter: A Constitutional
Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1252 (1994).
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and skewed to the political right—were both incorrect,25 and also
that the political cost of such regulation is simply too high. The
political backlash at this time is still too great to justify what he sees
as the benefits of directly limiting the institutional press.26 At the
core of the First Amendment, however, should be the rejection of
the idea that the government should decide who is too influential, or
that government power should be used to limit the speech of those
deemed to have too much influence, whether we are talking the
institutional press or anybody else. That is simply not a power we
entrust to government. Until recently, it seemed to be understood
that that was what the First Amendment is about.27
The reason Buckley has survived forty years, despite forty years
of determined scholarship criticizing it, is that the case for reform,
on close examination, simply is not very good. The idea that the
Constitution allows more regulation than we have now, which is
more than we ever had before the 1970s, and in many particulars
(such as federal limits on contributions to state and local parties)28
more than ever, is not compatible with our historic understanding of
the First Amendment, which is intended “to assure [the] unfettered

25

RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 129–30 &
nn.12–15 (2016) [hereinafter HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED].
26
Id. at 126–27.
27
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“The First Amendment
affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order ‘to assure (the)
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.’” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957))); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL),
551 U.S. 449, 482 (2007) (“‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.’ . . . Our jurisprudence over the past 216 years has rejected an
absolutist interpretation of those words, but when it comes to drawing difficult
lines in the area of pure political speech—between what is protected and what the
Government may ban—it is worth recalling the language we are applying . . . [W]e
give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship. The First Amendment’s
command that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech’
demands at least that.”).
28
See 52 U.S.C. § 30116 (a)(1)(D) (2014), passed as part of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2003.
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interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.”29
III. THE CORRUPTION OF “CORRUPTION”
Broadly put, the reasons offered as justifications for limiting
campaign spending and contributions are to (a) prevent government
corruption, and (b) promote political equality.30 In Buckley, the
Supreme Court held that the promotion of equality was an
insufficiently compelling government interest to justify limitations
on political speech.31 But the Court also held that the prevention of
“corruption,” and its appearance, was a compelling enough reason
to justify at least some restrictions on financing campaign speech.32
The Court thus upheld some limited mandatory public disclosure
and limitations on contributions,33 but not limits on expenditures.34
As a result of the Court’s ruling in Buckley, arguments
supporting restrictions on political speech in the name of equality
are non-starters in the courts.35 Thus, scholars seeking to impact the
debate have argued at length over the potentially corrupting effects
of campaign contributions.36 The difficulty for those who favor
greater restrictions is that when it discusses “corruption,” the Court
29

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). See generally John O.
McGinniss, Neutral Principles and Some Campaign Finance Problems, 57 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 841 (2016)) (“In hundreds of cases from disparate walks of
life . . . the Court has teased out the logic of the Amendment’s underlying plan:
protect a civic discourse created by individual choice.”).
30
See ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
AND THE CONSTITUTION 47 (2014).
31
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49 (“[T]he concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”)
32
Id. at 32.
33
Id. at 26–27, 67.
34
Id. at 58–59 (holding that the government’s limitation on independent,
personal and campaign expenditures violate the First Amendment).
35
See Elizabeth Garrett, New Voices in Politics: Justice Marshall’s
Jurisprudence on Law and Politics, 52 HOW. L.J. 655, 671 (2009).
36
See Eugene D. Mazo, The Disappearance of Corruption and the New Path
Forward in Campaign Finance, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 259, 270–74
(2014).
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has in mind a narrow definition of quid pro quo exchange: “dollars
for political favors.”37 But there is not much evidence that campaign
spending and contributions cause that type of corruption.38 For many
years, supporters of regulation argued for a broader definition of
“corruption,” and at times made headway, most notably in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, in which Justice Marshall
successfully smuggled in the equality rationale under the guise of
“corruption.”39 But such outlier decisions had relatively little effect
on the long-term course of the law,40 and the Roberts Court wisely

37

McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014)
(quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)); see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27 (“To the extent that
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy
is undermined.”); see also Allen Dickerson, McCutcheon v. FEC and the Supreme
Court’s Return Back to Buckley, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 95, 107–17
(discussing the Buckley Court’s definition of “corruption” and its effect on other
case law).
38
See, e.g., Adriana S. Cordis & Jeffrey Milyo, Measuring Public
Corruption in the United States: Evidence From Administrative Records of
Federal Prosecutions, 18 PUB. INTEGRITY 127, 137 (2016) (finding that most
public corruption crimes involve “bribery, conspiracy, embezzlement, false
statements, and theft,” and are committed by low level employees). See generally
Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17
J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (2003) (summarizing results of more than 20 empirical
studies on effects of money in politics). The evidence that lobbying skews
legislative results is much more solid than the claim that campaign contributions
do, albeit that many lobbyists also make campaign contributions. See, e.g., FRANK
R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, LOSES,
AND WHY (2009) (examining the effects of lobbying on 98 issues before
Congress). But lobbying is rarely the target of proposed limits or bans, perhaps
because it is more hidden and thus generates less controversy with the public, or
perhaps because reform advocates cannot figure out a way to limit lobbying that
does not even more obviously violate the constitution, since the officeholders do
not receive a direct benefit from lobbying and money does not change hands. See id.
39
See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 692–95
(1990). For a detailed description of Marshall’s successful recasting of an
egalitarian rationale as the prevention of “corruption,” see Garrett, supra note 35,
at 670–78.
40
Garrett, supra note 35, at 678–79.
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slammed the door on them.41 Of course, many Americans believe
that campaign spending results in such corruption, in no small part
because large sums have been spent to convince them of that fact.42
Yet despite that, there is even less evidence that regulation improves
public perception of government. So it turns out that regulation does
not even address the “appearance of corruption.”43
Recent years, however, have seen a new effort to redefine
“corruption” in sweepingly broad terms. Buckley and its progeny
have defined “corruption” as “quid pro quo.”44 This has sparked a
rather odd academic preoccupation with the possible meanings of
“corruption”—the label the Court gave to activity that justified
limited restrictions—rather than with the actual activity that Buckley
and its progeny considered a justification for limited restrictions on
First Amendment rights.45 Among the most distinguished scholars
41

See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 336–65
(2010); see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (“Any regulation must . . . target
what we have called ‘quid pro quo’ corruption or its appearance. That Latin phrase
captures the notion of a direct exchange of an official act for money.”).
42
See Bradley A. Smith, Politics, Money and Corruption: The Story of
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, in ELECTION LAW STORIES 313, 329331 (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016) [hereinafter Smith,
Politics, Money and Corruption].
43
See Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and
Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 119, 124–29 (2004); Jeff Milyo, Do State Campaign Finance
Reforms Increase Trust and Confidence in State Government? (Mar. 30, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with University of Missouri),
http://faculty.missouri.edu/~milyoj/files/CFR%20and%20trust%20in%20state%
20government_v8.pdf.
44
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–28 (1976); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at
1441; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359; Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to
Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. 449, 478 (2007); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497–98 (1985); Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297 (1981); c.f.
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 143 (“Thus, ‘[i]n speaking of
“improper influence” and “opportunities for abuse” in addition to “quid pro quo
arrangements,” we [have] recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public
officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with
the wishes of large contributors.’” (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 389 (2000))).
45
See Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand
‘Corruption’ to Mean, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2014) [hereinafter Lessig,
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to take on this effort in recent years are Larry Lessig,46 Zephyr
Teachout,47 and Robert Post.48 While a full review of each scholar’s
work, let alone the full body of literature, is beyond the scope of this
article, a quick examination of these three is merited if only to get a
flavor for recent approaches aimed at a functional upending of
Buckley and more regulation of political speech.
Teachout, a professor at Fordham University School of Law and
a candidate for Governor of New York in 2014, argues that the
Constitution contains an “anti-corruption” principle that justifies
most any act of government power needed to stop what Teachout,
and similarly minded academics, might view as “corruption.” She
finds this sweeping principle—overriding the more obvious First
Amendment commandment to “make no law” limiting speech—
hidden in some unlikely corners of the Constitution, particularly the
Ineligibility Clause, the Incompatibility Clause, and the Foreign
Emoluments Clause.49 The idea that there exists in these obscure
clauses a sort of free-floating, hitherto undiscovered anti-corruption
principle that provides constitutional justification for Professor
Teachout’s campaign finance policy preferences is interesting, but
ultimately untenable.50 Such obscure clauses in the Constitution
Originalist Understanding]; Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). For a discussion on why this effort to find an
“originalist” principle of “corruption” is misplaced, see Seth Barrett Tillman, Why
Professor Lessig’s “Dependence Corruption” Is Not a Founding-Era Concept,
13 ELECTION L.J. 336 (2014) [hereinafter Tillman, Lessig’s Dependence
Corruption].
46
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS
POLITICS - AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2012) [hereinafter LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST];
Lessig, Originalist Understanding, supra note 45.
47
Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 45; ZEPHYR
TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX
TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014); see Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption,
107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 30 (2012).
48
See POST, supra note 30.
49
Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 45, at 359
(“Ultimately, three of the biggest protections created by the Framers were the
Ineligibility Clause, the Emoluments Clause, and the Foreign Gifts Clause.”); see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; id. § 9, cl. 8.
50
The one scholar who has taken the trouble to thoroughly rebut Teachout’s
theory in detail is Seth Barrett Tillman of Ireland’s Maynooth University. See Seth
Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-
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simply do not support such sweeping conclusions when measured
against the much plainer, more straightforward language of the First
Amendment.51
Robert Post, the Dean at Yale Law School, argues that the focus
on “corruption” is “a constitutional blind alley.”52 His solution is to
recast a broad definition of corruption as “electoral integrity.”53 But
what is “electoral integrity?” It is not a “concept that can be applied
to the particular decisions of particular representatives,” but rather
“a system of representation in which the public trusts that
representatives will be attentive to public opinion.”54 In the end,
“electoral integrity,” however, turns out to be a vague concept that
does not really seem much different than the traditional rationale
that some believe that money in politics is too influential.55 So
“electoral integrity” winds up being about the effect of money on

Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1 (2012) [hereinafter
Tillman, Citizens United and Teachout’s Principle]; Seth Barrett Tillman, The
Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: A Reply to
Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 180 (2013).
Professor Tillman’s research leaves little doubt that these constitutional clauses
cannot support the weight Professor Teachout places on them.
51
See Tillman, Citizens United and Teachout’s Principle, supra note 50; see
also McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372, 2375 (2016) (warning
that despite public official’s “distasteful” and “tawdry” behavior, the
“breathtaking expansion of public-corruption law” was a substantial concern
rendering a corruption prosecution unconstitutional (citation omitted)). For a
response to the claims of Professors Teachout and Lessig that they have identified
a unique “originalist” concern, see Tillman, Lessig’s Dependence Corruption,
supra note 45.
52
POST, supra note 30, at 58.
53
Id. at 60.
54
Id. at 61 (emphasis omitted).
55
See id. at 64 (arguing that in early twentieth-century Montana “electoral
integrity” was violated by “massive expenditures by mining corporations”).
Robert Natelson’s detailed history suggests that Post’s understanding of the era is
incorrect. See ROBERT G. NATELSON, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POL., MONTANA’S
SUPREME COURT RELIES ON ERRONEOUS HISTORY IN REJECTING CITIZENS UNITED
3–4 (2012), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/201206-Natelson-Montanas-Supreme-Court-Relies-on-Erroneous-History.pdf.
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officeholders after all.56 This sounds a lot like what Teachout and
Lessig term “corruption.” Whatever “electoral integrity” is, it is not
quid pro quo corruption, but rather an amorphous concept that any
speaker, legislator, or judge might apply to justify a speech
restriction—exactly what the First Amendment prevents.57
Harvard Law School’s Professor Lessig, for his part, offers up
what he terms “dependence corruption.”58 This, he recognizes, is
quite different from quid pro quo corruption, and indeed does not
actually require individual officeholders to be corrupt in any way.59
Rather, he sees policy outcomes being skewed by large
expenditures, and that, he argues, makes the institutions themselves
“corrupt.” In other words, legislators respond to donors’ wishes, or,
as Lessig would frame it, they become “dependent” on their political
supporters.60 However, this sounds suspiciously like saying that
legislators are grateful to those who help them win an election, and
it is hard to see why that can, or should, be a justification that trumps
the First Amendment right to free speech. Of course legislators
consider and often respond to the policy preferences of those who
help them get elected.61 Why would citizens participate in the
political process if they did not? Of course people who support a
campaign, financially or otherwise, seek to sway electoral
outcomes.62 It would be shocking if it were otherwise. To suggest
that voters should not be swayed, or to determine that voters are
routinely, and predictably, fooled in such a way that government can
manage the debate so that they are not fooled (or perhaps fooled only
56

See Pamela S. Karlan, Citizens Deflected: Electoral Integrity and Political
Reform, in CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 30, at 141, 141–152.
57
Bradley A. Smith, Why Should ‘Electoral Integrity’ Exclude Freedom of
Speech?,
LIBR.
L.
&
LIBERTY
(Mar.
3,
2015),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/03/03/why-should-electoral-integrityexclude-freedom-of-speech/#sthash.BjYdVrPs.dpuf.
58
LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST, supra note 46, at 17.
59
Lessig, Originalist Understanding, supra note 45, at 6–7.
60
Id. at 4 (“[T]he money election produces a subtle, perhaps camouflaged
bending to keep the funders in the money elections happy.”).
61
See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
62
See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790–91 (1978)
(“[A]dvertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its
purpose.”).
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to some appropriate degree) is to give up on the democratic project
itself. To the extent we find it disturbing that there is rent-seeking in
government, the Founders looked to limits on government, not
limits on the people, to prevent it. These limits on government,
ironically, have been substantially eroded by other progressive
thinkers and politicians.63
Professor Lessig’s “corruption” is a strange type of
“corruption,” one in which no one is actually “corrupt,” but political
activity makes some political and policy outcomes more likely.
Politics and campaigning, however, are all about making certain
political and policy outcomes more likely. Professor Hasen’s
critique, that at root, Professor Lessig’s “dependence corruption” is
really an equality argument, is persuasive.64 After all, money
“distorts” legislative outcomes because some people have more of
it than others.
In any case, these efforts to redefine “corruption” as something
broader than the quid pro quo meaning utilized by the Supreme
Court all fail to provide a consistent or principled basis for a judge
to decide actual cases,65 and thus none provides a consistent or
serious check on state abuse of power to squelch dissenting views.
If these are all judges have to go on, why bother with a First
Amendment at all, other than to empower judges to periodically
insert themselves into the political process? In short, none of them
63

Bradley A. Smith, Hamilton at Wits End: The Lost Discipline of the
Spending Clause vs. the False Discipline of Campaign Finance Reform, 4 CHAP.
L. REV. 117, 128–29 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the
Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 56 (1992).
64
Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 HARV. L. REV. 550, 572
(2012); see Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990);
Elizabeth Garrett, supra note 35, 670–78 (disclosing, as Justice
Thurgood Marshall’s clerk during the Austin Term, that his opinion was based on
an egalitarian rationale but, in order to gain a court majority, termed that rationale
a “different type of corruption”). Austin was overruled in Citizens United.
Professor Lessig has vigorously contested Hasen’s characterization of his
argument, leading to a lively (for law reviews) debate. See Lawrence Lessig, A
Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 61 (2012); Richard L. Hasen, Is
“Dependence Corruption” Distinct From a Political Equality Rationale for
Campaign Finance Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 ELECTION L. J. 305
(2013); Lessig, Originalist Understanding, supra note 45, at 12–15. I score it a
win for Professor Hasen—not a K.O., but a lopsided margin on points.
65
Mazo, supra note 36, at 261–62.
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address the reason that the Court has adopted quid pro quo as the
Constitutional line that must be drawn to protect free speech from
an overweening legislature—it is the only rationale that can be
cabined off to prevent the regulation from overrunning the speech at
the core of the First Amendment.
IV. REINVIGORATING THE EQUALITY RATIONALE
Professor Hasen, rather than engage in contortions of coming up
with a new definition of “corruption” that the Supreme Court will
correctly reject in any case,66 attempts to revitalize a forthright case
for the equality rationale in his book Plutocrats United.67 Although
arguments for regulating speech to enhance equality are not new,68
Professor Hasen’s straightforward effort to reinvigorate the equality
argument merits a brief review, even if this short essay is not the
place to explore its contours in depth. Hasen’s work in Plutocrats
United is more sensitive to First Amendment concerns than some of
his earlier writings,69 offering much greater recognition of the First
Amendment rights involved.70 But whatever exceptions there might
be to the plain language of the First Amendment prohibition on

66

See id. Professor Mazo notes that these efforts to redefine corruption are
necessary because of the Court’s Buckley doctrine, but ultimately have come to
constitute an ever more elaborate “distraction” that no longer moves the
discussion forward. Id. at 260–61.
67
HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 25. For another relatively recent
effort, see Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of
Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599.
68
See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 24 (arguing that the First Amendment’s purpose
is in the preservation of democracy through public discourse, allowing people to
“vote intelligently and freely”); Foley, supra note 24 (advocating an end to the
media exception for corporations and promoting equal financial resources to all
eligible voters).
69
See Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/
Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996)
[hereinafter Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy] (proposing a voucher
program for federal election to promote an egalitarian political market); Hasen,
Campaign Finance Laws, supra note 23 (proposing to abolish the “press
exemption” for media).
70
HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 25, at 21–22.
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restrictions on speech,71 such a flowing, nebulous concept as
“equality” does not seem to have been contemplated by the
Constitution. Professor Hasen still fails to come to grips with the
fundamental problem of regulating political speech: why is the First
Amendment worded as a restriction on government regulation,
rather than a command to enhance equality, assure enlightened or
balanced debate, or guarantee that adequate points of view are heard?
The First Amendment prohibits congressional action to regulate
speech not because the drafters and the ratifying states were
unconcerned about bribery, power, and ethics (on this much, at least,
Professor Teachout is correct), or unconcerned about having a
government reliant on the people (as Professor Lessig points out),
or political equality (score one for Professor Hasen). These concerns
should be obvious enough that it is bizarre that law review articles
are written about them. Rather, restricting Congress’s ability to limit
speech was determined to be the best means to address those
concerns, at least as balanced against other values and fears.72 The
First Amendment adopts that approach because the drafters and
ratifiers were realistic about government power and its abuse.73 The
71

“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
72
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 63, at 56 (suggesting that the “right solution”
is to reduce the power of government to transfer wealth and dispense favors rather
than limit speech); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the
First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1068–
74 (1985) [hereinafter BeVier, Money and Politics] (arguing that the courts should
not defer to Congress’s judgment on the need for campaign finance legislation).
73
See JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 196–209 (Charles
Hobson & Robert Rutland eds., 1979); Steven Helle, Prior Restraint by the Back
Door: Conditional Rights, 39 VILL. L. REV. 824, 825–26 (1994); C. EDWIN
BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194–249 (1989); David A.
Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 534 (1983);
C. Edwin Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34
U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 840 (1980); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value
in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (discussing that free
expression intended to check abuses of government power, and arguing that courts
should interpret First Amendment with this factor in mind); Potter Stewart, “Or
of the Press”, 26 HASTING L. J. 631, 634 (1975) (discussing that the primary
purpose of the First Amendment’s Press Clause was to create a check on
government power).
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problem with an equality rationale, or sweeping redefinitions of
“corruption,” is that they are bottomless pits that can justify almost
any decision on censorship a politician wants to make. What
judgment limiting campaign speech could an officeholder, or a court
granting the legislature substantial deference, not justify as
somehow promoting political equality?74 Equality is indeed an
American value, and so presumably was considered when the First
Amendment, with its absolutist language against regulation of
speech, was written. The First Amendment contains no affirmative
power for government to promote the value of equality of speech
and influence. Quite the contrary, it suggests that equality is either
best met through a regime that allows “all channels of
communication be open to [the people] during every election, that
[leaves] no point of view be restrained or barred,”75 or that it was
determined that other values, mainly fear of government censorship
and tyranny, make it best to keep government out of the business of
policing speech.
Separately from Professor Hasen, and in apparent rebuttal to this
rather plain constitutional language, Justice Stephen Breyer, a
former law professor, has taken to arguing that the Court should not
presume laws limiting political speech are unconstitutional because
there are “First Amendment interests . . . on both sides.”76 So what?
Or perhaps better put, of course there are interests on both sides.
There are constitutional interests and values on both sides of almost
every provision in the Constitution, from requiring Congress to keep

74

See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments,
Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1267–68 (1994); see also
Bradley A. Smith, The John Roberts Salvage Company: After McConnell, A New
Court Looks to Repair the Constitution, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 891, 904–10 (2007).
Although in this piece I speak more of a broad corruption analysis, the points are
equally if not more applicable to an egalitarian analysis.
75
United States v. Int’l Union, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
76
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466 (2014)
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 48 (2005); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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a journal of its proceedings77 to repealing prohibition.78 Having a
minimum age for President,79 for example, balances mature
judgment in office-holders, versus permitting a full range of options
to voters. The point is not whether there are interests or values
lurking around any particular constitutional issue, but rather how the
Constitution chooses to deal with the issue. For presidential age, the
Constitution mandates a minimum of thirty-five;80 for speech, it
takes the position that Congress shall pass no law, not that it shall
“pass only laws reasonably calculated to promote democratic
accountability,” or some such standard. Perhaps “no law” does not
really mean “no exceptions ever,”81 but surely it must at least mean
there is a presumption that laws regulating speech are
unconstitutional. Otherwise, the word “no” is left meaningless.
As part of his egalitarian reform proposals, Professor Hasen has
long advocated for a nationwide voucher program,82 and raises this
idea again in Plutocrats United.83 I will not address here the
practical difficulties of his program—having been on the
enforcement side of things, I can say that they are, in my view,
thoroughly insurmountable, which may be why they remain
academic rather than legislative proposals—but instead focus on the
limits he proposes to accompany this program. He would limit
expenditures to $25,000 in any race and $500,000 total, though he
is amenable to some other number,84 which makes sense since there
77

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, would seem to pit the value of open government
against the benefits of private deliberation.
78
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, pits the harms of prohibition against the harms
of drinking.
79
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
80
Id.
81
I’m perfectly willing to have Justice Holmes’s opinion in in Schenck v.
United States (upholding conviction under the Espionage Act for printing and
distributing anti-war pamphlets) thrown at me, as Professor Hasen does, see
discussion in HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 25. “The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing a panic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). I
do think that Schenck was wrongly decided, and is one of many embarrassing
opinions written by Justice Holmes.
82
See Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy, supra note 69.
83
HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 25, at 102.
84
Id.
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appears to be no particular reason for using these limits, other than
that they are round numbers. Professor Hasen says that such limits
will not matter because most Americans cannot afford to spend a lot
of money anyway.85 Leave aside, for the moment, that large
spenders often represent large numbers of people—think of the antiwar millionaires who funded Gene McCarthy’s 1968 anti-war
campaign for president,86 or Ross Perot spending his money to make
deficit spending an issue in the 1992 and 1996 campaigns,87 or ice
cream mogul Ben Cohen of Ben & Jerry’s flacking for Bernie
Sanders’ socialism88—and leave aside that many potential listeners
may want to hear those views, delivered by those speakers. We still
do not generally give government the authority to limit rights based
on the number of Americans who will directly use them. The vast
majority of Americans will never need a criminal defense attorney;
they will never be subjected to a warrantless home search; they will
never have difficulty getting an ID enabling them to vote.89 But we
do not think that this allows us to strip these rights from those who
do need or desire to use them.
So Professor Hasen’s effort, however well-intentioned, appears
to be exactly the issue that the First Amendment decided.
Government may not limit speech to promote equality, even if one
85

Id.
Richard Cohen, How Political Donations Changed History, WASH. POST (Jan.
16, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-political-donationschanged-history/2012/01/16/gIQA6oH63P_story.html.
87
See Steven A. Holmes, Perot Plan to Attack Deficit Thrust Issue at Opponents,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/28/us/1992campaign-ross-perot-perot-plan-attack-deficit-thrusts-issueopponents.html?pagewanted=all.
88
Samantha Bonar, Q&A: Ben & Jerry’s Cofounder Ben Cohen Talks About
His New Bernie Sanders Ice Cream, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/food/dailydish/la-dd-ben-jerrys-bernie-sanders-icecream-20160127-story.html; 7 Reasons Why Ben & Jerry’s Supports Campaign
Finance
Reform,
BEN
&
JERRY’S,
INC.
(Jan.
22,
2016),
http://www.benjerry.com/whats-new/campaign-finance-reform.
89
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, it was determined that
approximately one percent of the state’s voters lacked a current, acceptable ID.
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 218–19 (2008) (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Some estimates put the number as high as six to ten percent. Id. at
219. But of course many of those persons could get ID with relatively little
difficulty.
86
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thinks it will only harm a few wealthy people. The cure—limiting
or silencing some voices through government action—is worse than
the disease. Indeed, that cure may be the disease the First
Amendment was intended to guard against.
Professor Hasen seems stung by the charge that his proposals
amount to “censorship,” devoting a full chapter of Plutocrats United
to rebutting that charge.90 But Professor Hasen thinks he has found
the answer to the charge in Bluman v. Federal Election
Commission.91 In Bluman, a three-judge panel of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia upheld the federal ban on political
contributions to candidates, and express advocacy expenditures,92
by non-U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and the Supreme
Court summarily affirmed. Professor Hasen seems to believe that
Bluman solves his censorship problem. He argues that even
opponents of campaign finance restrictions support the ruling in
Bluman,93 citing as examples Floyd Abrams,94 James Bopp,95 and
(incorrectly) me.96 If First Amendment advocates do not support
90

HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 25, at 107–23.
Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011),
aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
92
Id. at 282–85. Buckley cabined off certain campaign finance rules to be
applicable only to “express advocacy,” which it defined as “communications
containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as “vote for,”
“elect,” “support,” “cast your ballot for,” “Smith for Congress,” “vote against,”
“defeat,” “reject.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45, n.52. The importance of
“express advocacy” is discussed in Bradley A. Smith, Politics, Money and
Corruption, supra note 42, at 319–21.
93
HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 25, at 114–17.
94
Floyd Abrams has a powerful claim to being the most distinguished First
Amendment litigators of the last fifty years. See David Segal, A Matter of
Opinion?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
18,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/business/19floyd.html?_r=0 (“The most
famous First Amendment lawyer in the country.”).
95
James Bopp has made a national reputation as one of the best, if not
the best litigator in the country for campaign finance deregulation. See Terry
Carter,
The
Big
Bopper,
ABA
J.
(Nov.
24,
2006),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_big_bopper.
96
See HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 25, at 114–15. Professor
Hasen, I must note, is incorrect in saying that I was “not at all bothered by the
total and absolute ban” on Bluman’s political spending, and that I “support[] the
government’s ability to strip . . . Benjamin Bluman of the right to spend a penny
91
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Ben Bluman’s right to spend in American elections, or, he adds for
good measure, laws against bribery,97 then all bets are off. For if
Bopp, Abrams, or I do not think there is a constitutional right for
aliens to contribute, or, it appears, for citizens to bribe, then there is
no real difference in principle between regulatory advocates such as
himself, and free speech advocates such as Bopp, Abrams, and me—
it is just a question of “where to draw the line.”98
to support a political candidate.” Id. at 115. Professor Hasen cites as evidence of
my alleged support for the decision in Bluman a blog post of mine published the
morning after the Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of the decision. See
Bradley A. Smith, Bluman v. FEC and the Infield Fly Rule (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2012/01/09/bluman-v-fec-and-the-infield-flyrule/. Re-reading the post, I can see why one might conclude that I supported the
decision. If one reads the post, however, I do not say that. Indeed, the post does
not argue Bluman either way. Rather, it notes only that Professor Hasen’s claim
that the decision created “doctrinal incoherence” is wrong. The opinion in the case
by the district court, affirmed by the Supreme Court, is not, as Professor Hasen
alleges, inconsistent, let alone doctrinally incoherent, with Citizens United.
Frankly, I am more or less agnostic on the result in Bluman, and because I do not
consider it, as a practical matter, a very important case, I have not worried too
much about sorting out my concerns. As the blog post Professor Hasen quotes
states quite clearly, as an empirical matter I am not terribly worried about foreign
money damaging our democracy today. Indeed, I have been criticized for failing
to show more concern about the possibility that some foreigner, somewhere, is,
undetected, spending money in connection with U.S. elections. See Jon Schwarz,
Foreign Money is Flowing into U.S. Elections, Alito’s Lying Lips Notwithstanding,
INTERCEPT (Mar. 31, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/03/31/foreign-moneyis-flowing-into-u-s-elections-alitos-lying-lips-notwithstanding/. I think voters would
sort that type of foreign involvement out and vote accordingly against a candidate
they felt was subject to undue foreign influence. But I understand that others are
much more bothered by the thought of foreign voices in U.S. elections. See, e.g.,
Ellen Weintraub, Taking on Citizens United, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/opinion/taking-n-citizens-united.html?_r=0
(arguing that corporations with even one non-U.S. citizen or permanent resident
shareholder should be prohibited from making political expenditures). However,
and this is important, it really does not matter to the argument which way I come
down on Bluman, because the analogy is wholly inapt, as I explain in the text.
97
HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 25, at 118. Given Professor
Hasen’s suggestion that laws prohibiting bribery are akin to “censorship,” I would
also like to make clear that I support laws against bribery, and do not believe that
support for such laws undercuts arguments against campaign finance regulations,
either.
98
Id. at 117–18.
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Well, of course there are lines to be drawn. What Professor
Hasen misses is that it matters where the lines are drawn and why. It
is simply insufficient to suggest that the only difference between a
parent who lies about the existence of Santa Clause and a con man
who intentionally defrauds consumers is “where to draw the line”
on lying, and then conclude that both are “liars” and that either
standard is equally valid.
When lines are being drawn, it seems hardly necessary to
mention that the Constitution often treats citizens differently from
noncitizens.99 The argument for excluding noncitizens has nothing
to do with equality, or even preventing corruption, but rather with
time-honored, and indeed constitutionalized, conceptions about
make-up of the political community.100 The ban on non-U.S. citizen
participation, whether right or wrong, is conceptually distinct from
efforts, such as Professor Hasen’s, to ban or limit participation by
U.S. citizens, including citizens who organize themselves in the
corporate form.101
Further, there are simply practical considerations that
distinguish the two. Limiting the participation of foreign citizens is
a clear line that, once enacted, is not readily subject to political
manipulation. Professor Hasen’s equality justification, however, or
Professors Lessig, Teachout, and Post’s broad anti-corruption
theories, are infinitely malleable. There is no general definition of
those concepts that would tell us what Congress could or could not
prohibit. Again, this malleability allows the government to
manipulate the law to squelch disfavored opinions and political
opposition. Once one recognizes that the First Amendment was
99

See Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 287–88
(D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (cataloguing several such
distinctions).
100
See id. at 288. (“It is fundamental to the definition of our national political
community that foreign citizens do not have a constitutional right to participate
in, and thus may be excluded from, activities of democratic self-government.”).
Note that 52 U.S.C. § 30121 allows for lawful permanent resident aliens to make
financial contributions and expenditures.
101
See Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy, supra note 69, at 23;
Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws, supra note 23, at 1628. Professor Hasen
apparently believes that U.S. citizens should lose their speech rights if they
organize themselves as a corporation. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws, supra
note 23, at 1628.
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intended to prevent government manipulation of debate, one sees
that Professor Hasen’s broad equality rationale, and the regulation it
could spawn, is exactly the type of danger that the First Amendment
aims to prevent. Constitutional language and purpose merge, as they
should. Regardless of whether one favor’s Bluman’s antiforeigner
rationale, it seems less open to manipulation and less problematic
under the First Amendment.
Efforts to limit citizen speech in the name of equality also betray
the Court’s landmark decision in United States v. Carolene Products
Corporation.102 In that decision’s famous footnote four, the Court
made clear that while it would abandon meaningful judicial scrutiny
of economic regulation, “legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about the repeal
of undesirable legislation” would presumably face a tougher
hurdle.103 Now, campaign finance reformers wish to call off this
“great compromise,” fearful that certain actors have become too
likely to succeed in bringing about such repeal.104 And, to again
compare with Bluman, there is little reason to think that Carolene
Products was about permitting alien citizens to participate in that
debate.
Nor should history be discounted. Unlimited participation by
individual citizens—including minors—was, until the 1970s, taken
for granted.105 U.S. corporations have also traditionally been
102

See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Id. at 152 n.4 (“[L]egislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.”).
104
John Samples, The End of the Great Compromise, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY
(June 21, 2016), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/the-end-of-thegreat-compromise/.
105
FECA was the first federal law to limit general individual contributions.
Even the Hatch Act of 1939, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1508, 7321–7326 (1939), which
placed strict limits on political activities of government employees, did not limit
their ability to contribute voluntarily to political campaigns. The act was intended
to prevent coercion of government employees, and also the ability of government
to use tax money to entrench itself in power. See Scott S. Bloch, The Judgment of
History: Faction, Political Machines, and the Hatch Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 225, 231–34 (2005). Similarly, the Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883 had
prevented coercion of government employees to make political contributions, but
103
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valuable participants in political debate,106 with the 1907 ban on
corporate contributions often honored more in the breach than in the
observance.107 Noncitizen participation in politics, however, has
long been disfavored.108 In other words, no one is undermining
traditional understandings of the First Amendment in Bluman. But
the arguments that the academy is promulgating in support of
regulation are, quite intentionally, aimed at undermining traditional
understandings of the First Amendment when they offer
justifications for broad restraints on political activity by U.S.
citizens.109 If we are talking about threats to the First Amendment,
as this symposium presumes, we presumably mean things that
change the status quo, which Bluman did not. The forty-year
scholarly effort to undermine protection for citizen speech,
including overruling Buckley v. Valeo and, hence, all of its
legitimate progeny, is a threat to our established First Amendment
norms of free speech, free association, and democratic dialogue.
In the end, there is nothing new about Professor Hasen’s
egalitarian rationale—it was argued to the Court in Buckley and
rejected, and has been rejected many times since.110 The reason is
fairly obvious: it is because, again, no matter how we try, giving the
had not prohibited employees from making them voluntarily. Pendleton Civil
Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403, §2 (1883). See Bloch, supra note 105,
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government the power to limit the speech of some in order to
enhance the voices of others really is “wholly foreign to the First
Amendment,” which was intended to deny government that
power.111 The First Amendment was intended to deny government
that power because we cannot trust the government not to abuse that
power; or to use it as cover for other goals; or simply to adopt, in
error, bad policies that erode our democracy. These include
proposals that such advocates may later regret, such as passing the
1974 FECA amendments, or limiting newspaper endorsements. And
here we should note that at some point, the claims of virtually every
egalitarian theorist—from distinguished judges such as J. Skelly
Wright,112 to distinguished academics such as Professor Lessig,113
to political candidates like Bernie Sanders—eventually devolve to
arguing that regulation and limits are necessary because free speech
is dissuading the voters from supporting the policy goals favored by
the advocates of restricting speech.114 That is what the First
Amendment prevents.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the forty-year academic assault on free speech
has consequences that pose a threat to speech beyond even campaign
finance. Although it is true that the Court does not always appear to
have a unified First Amendment theory—it sometimes cabins off

111

at 1068.
112

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49; see BeVier, Money and Politics, supra note 72,

See J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 618–19
& n. 63 (1982) (arguing that restraints on campaign contributions and spending
are necessary to impose various policies, such as “a windfall profits tax on oil
companies, hospital cost containment, . . . a superfund for the victims of toxic
chemicals, or any other legislation that affects powerful interests”).
113
See One Mission, LESSIG2016.US, https://lessig2016.us/one-mission/
(last visited Dec. 31, 2016) (demonstrating Professor Lessig’s official website for
his aborted 2016 presidential campaign). Here Lessig argues that greater
campaign finance regulation is necessary if we are to properly address “every
issue, from climate change to gun safety, from Wall Street reform to defense
spending.” Id.
114
See SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH, supra note 107, at 120–21, 145–46.

252

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

different areas of speech under somewhat different doctrines115—
there is little doubt that doctrine in one area influences doctrine in
another, and, more important for our purposes, that attacks on free
speech in one area likely undermine public support for free speech
in other areas. A recent Pew Research Center survey found that
Millenials are generally less supportive of free speech than the
Greatest Generation, Baby Boomers, or Generation Xers.116
Similarly, Gallup found that while current college students support
free speech in the abstract, in its concrete applications their support
is thin: 49 percent think it is legitimate to prevent reporters from
covering campus protests if the organizers think the reporters will
be biased; 69 percent favor restrictions on slurs that are intentionally
offensive to minority groups.117 Yet another national survey found
that over half of those polled favored campus speech codes, and over
one-third believed that the First Amendment did not protect “hate
speech.”118 Half favored banning political cartoons offensive to
some religions.119 These findings should be troubling—at least to
the substantial majorities of seniors, Boomers, and Generation Xers
who have free speech high in their pantheon on values.
It is fair to say that a half-century of clever argumentation as to
why we should support silencing some views has carried over to a
more general atmosphere that views we do not like should be
115
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silenced, if not by law then by mob action, either physically or in
the virtual world of social media.120
We all, pretty much, recognize that political speech is at the core
of the First Amendment, and that efforts to limit spending on politics
in fact cuts hard against these core First Amendment rights. Yet
these rights have been subject to relentless rhetorical assault in the
academy for decades.121 These attacks on the value of political
speech, whether framed as an anti-corruption interest or an
egalitarian interest, have a corrosive effect on society’s support for
free speech, its willingness to tolerate dissenting or opposing views,
and its openness to new knowledge and new ideas.
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the government’s real or alleged purposes are
beneficent. For if political speech about candidates and government
does not deserve maximum protection, what does? As Justice
Brandeis noted in Olmstead v. United States, “the greatest dangers
to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, wellmeaning but without understanding.”122
This is the big threat of campaign finance regulation, and
through it the academy has, and deserves, much blame for the
current threats to free speech.
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